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Abstract. The decline in the demographic ratio corollary to the maturity of the regime and 
in particular its generosity raise the question of the medium-and long-term financial 
sustainability of the civil pension scheme of the Moroccan pension fund. This article 
studies the financial sustainability of civil regimes and evaluates the options for reforms 
envisaged by the government mainly parametric reform. In this framework, an actuarial and 
financial model based on demographic assumptions and macroeconomic parameters is 
constructed and used to analyze the financial sustainability of the status quo regime and the 
projected regime and also to test the parametric reform. We also use econometric tests such 
as non-stationarity, causality and cointegration between technical recipes and technical 
expenditures to empirically evaluate the sustainability of civil scheme of pensions. This 
paper concludes that the parametric reform of our civil pay-as-you-go system is 
unsustainable. It would therefore be in favor of other remedial measures and reform 
strategies to improve and enhance the financial sustainability of the fund, such as the model 
based on the addition of a funded pillar, and unification of all funds in a single integrated 
system.  
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1. Introduction 
or several years, the question of the unsustainability of pension schemes has 
become one of the priorities of social policies at the level of several 
countries. Demographic, economic and social changes have imposed many 
constraints on pension systems. Countries that have become aware of the risk of 
unsustainable pension systems and their impact on public finances have initiated 
successive reform processes aimed at redefining the fundamentals of their systems 
so that they remain balanced and sustainable. In this respect, Morocco has also 
entered into the process of correcting and reforming its current pension system. 
Indeed, Morocco's pension systems, particularly those based on the pay-as-you-
go principle, pose enormous problems of sustainability. The situation of the 
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financial balances of all the national pension funds has become a concern of the 
public authorities since the diagnosis of this pension system has revealed major 
dysfunctions. This difficult situation varies from one regime to another, it arises 
more acutely and more urgently for the civil pension scheme managed by the 
Moroccan Pension Fund 'CMR'. 
The implementation of reforms of civil pension regimes 'RPC' is therefore 
fundamental. A simple action on the parameters, retaining the current structure, 
could extend the viability horizon for a few years but could not solve the problem 
of its long-term financial sustainability. The objective of this paper is to study and 
evaluate the pre-reform and post-reform sustainability of the civil pensions regime 
and to propose different reform options to restore and improve the sustainability 
and financial balance of this regime. To achieve our objectives, this research 
addresses the main question: "What are the possible reform strategies that the civil 
regime of the CMR can adopt to ensure and improve its financial sustainability? ". 
After an introduction, the second section will present a short review of the 
literature on financial sustainability and analyze the problem of this concept within 
the current pension fund as well as the various reforms already developed in this 
context, a presentation of the different factors of imbalance is also discussed. The 
third section will be devoted to the presentation of the econometric tests of the 
sustainability of regime and the development of an actuarial and financial model 
allowing to analyze the impact of the different options of reforms on the 
sustainability of our regime. The fourth section will present the results of the 
analysis of the status quo sustainability indicators, empirical tests as well as the 
simulation results of the scenarios of civil service pension reforms. Similarly, we 
discuss in the same section the other reforms envisaged. And finaly we conclude 
with recommendations. 
 
2. Overall Framework for Financial Sustainability  
The problem of financial sustainability is not new. It is linked to the structural 
changes in pension systems and made more immediate and more perceptible as a 
result of the 2008 financial and economic crisis. 
2.1. Literature Review on Financial Sustainability 
Poor financial market returns and low long-term real interest rates in recent 
years have created challenges for the sponsors of defined benefit pension schemes. 
At the same time, lower payroll tax revenues in a period of high unemployment, 
and rising fiscal deficits in many advanced economies as economic activity has 
fallen, are also testing the sustainability of pay-as-you-go public pension schemes, 
Srichander (2012). While concerns about the sustainability of many pension 
schemes have come to public attention in recent years, specific challenges these 
schemes face as a result of increasing longevity. 
 The academic literature on the pension fund industry, which deals with the 
causes of financial sustainability, is extensive Black (1989), Brown et al. (2011), 
Dushi (2010) and Franzen (2010). According to Volker (2001), financial 
sustainability is the gradual reduction in the need for fiscal transfers from pension 
schemes in order to gradually and completely eliminate these transfers. 
Sustainability is a component of financial sustainability which implies that the 
benefits of the pension system can be covered by future revenues, the High 
Commission for Planning, High Commission for Planning HCP, (2012). The 
financial sustainability of social security is the ability of contributors and 
beneficiaries of the system to finance current benefits autonomously without 
resorting to the national budget or the state debt in order to maintain the long-term 
financial equilibrium of their system, Davis (1995). According to the World Bank 
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(1994); The aging of the population in the futur decades will certainly lead to major 
changes in the sustainability of pension systems, Bealite (2004). The question of 
the financial sustainability of social security has taken on a broader dimension for 
the construction of the Economic and Monetary Union Drèze.. 
The European Union set up a working group on Ageing Populations and 
Sustainability (AWG: Ageing Working Group), which develops medium and long-
term projections for age-related expenditures. The fourth edition of the AWG 
Report was released in May 2012. The Report covers all the main items financed 
by member States through PayGo: pensions, acute health care, long-term care 
(LTC), education, and unemployment benefits. Medium and long-term projections 
on the sustainability of public finances incorporate some of the figures from the 
Ageing report and are regularly produced in the Sustainability Report, informing 
the process of budgetary consolidation within the Monetary Union, Pammolli 
(2013). 
Assessing the sustainability of a welfare system requires the analysis of future 
trends in expenditure and thus a forecast of future liabilities and entitlements, 
Pammolli (2013). In an environment of globalization and increased competition, 
the financial sustainability of pension systems affects competition, as well as the 
financial stability of the European economy Davis, (2002). The challenges facing 
social programs are formidable, McHall (1999). Consequently, the role played by 
actuaries, demographers and statisticians in responding to these challenges is 
inevitably linked to issues of financial sustainability, Bohn (1999).  
The long-term sustainability of recent pension reforms depends crucially on 
their impact on the pension system’s ability to reduce poverty and replace pre-
retirement income and also on the ability of individuals to change their work and 
saving behaviour to accommodate the effects of reforms, Aaron (2010). 
One of the main goals of pension reform is to achieve financial sustainability, 
meaning the payment of current and future benefits according to an announced path 
of contribution rates without unannounced hikes in contribution rates, cuts in 
benefits, or deficits that need to be covered by budgetary resources. To be credible, 
a pension reform requires, above all, credible financial projections that include 
both short-term and long-term flows and an assessment of the status and utilization 
of stocks of accumulated assets, Holzmann & Hinz (2004). The idea that 
sustainability is achieved only by reducing future spending is, however, far too 
simplistic. Zaidi (2006) points out that "decision makers must remember that 
pensions are not introduced by chance." A retirement system does not succeed 
simply because it involves little expenditure. For Disney (1999) and Williamson 
(2003), notional accounts (NDC) are more sustainable than pay-as-you-go 
schemes. 
The philosophy underpinning the reform (NDC) was that the system should be 
financially stable in a changing demographic and economic climate and should, at 
the same time, create fairness between generations and income groups by 
diversifying economic, financial, and demographic risks, Holzmann, Palmer, & 
Robalino (2013). 
2.2. Issues of financial sustainability for the Moroccan pension system 
 Reflection on the issue of the financial sustainability of pension systems in 
Morocco began in 1997 when the Ministry of Economy and Finance with the 
World Bank launched actuarial studies and financial audits for the pension system. 
The results of the various committee studies were alarming. This prompted the 
Government to organize a national symposium on 16 and 17 December 2003 to 
deepen the debate on the issue of the financial sustainability of existing schemes. In 
Turkish Economic Review 
TER, 3(4), L. Aitoutouhen, & F. Hamza, p.652-667. 
655 
this regard, two committees were set up in 2004: the National Commission and the 
Technical Commission. 
 The debate on pension reform therefore focused on the long-term financial 
sustainability of schemes, highlighting the concepts of "sustainability horizon" and 
"implicit debt" to justify the urgency of reform. In May 2008, the Technical 
Commission was entrusted with the follow-up of the study on pension reform, and 
in May 2009, the commission presented the results of the first part of the study 
"updating the diagnosis". The year 2012 saw the continuation of the work of the 
Technical Commission for Retirement Reform. For its part, the High Commission 
for Planning (HCP) made public in 2012, a study on the sustainability of the 
pension system. The Court of Auditors conducted an evaluation mission in 2013 on 
the issue of balance, sustainability and coverage provided by pension schemes in 
Morocco. 
 On November 17, 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommended 
to the Moroccan government to launch a reform of the pension system. In this 
connection, the Government had referred the matter to the Economic, Social and 
Environmental Council (EESC). This consultative body confirmed on 31 October 
2015 the urgent need for a parametric reform. 
2.3. Key Factors of civil regime Unsustainability and Imbalance 
 The unsustainability of the regime is imputed to many constraints due to 
demographic, economic and governance factors that the parametric construction of 
the regime is unable to take care of. 
Degradation of demographic factor: In the case of civil regime, the 
demographic transition has meant that the demographic report has been 
considerably short-lived and on an ongoing basis High Commission to Plan (2005). 
Add to this the reduction in the contribution period due to the late entry into the 
labor market (28 years in 2015) due to the lengthening of the years of study and the 
level of recruitment which will not even allow the replacement of Retirements in 
terms of future workforce. 
Generosity of retirement system: The civil pension system is characterized by a 
high level of generosity of benefits compared to the contribution effort made. It 
offers its members a 2.5% right of the last salary for any year of contribution, 
which is a replacement rate which, with the high tax allowance (55%) available to 
retirees, can in some cases reach 100% after only 30 to 35 years of career 
Similarly, early retirement rules tend to be more generous. 
The payment of the pension on the basis of the last salary instead of an average 
career salary is a situation which can not be reconciled with the level of 
contribution. In addition, the generous nature of the scheme created an appealing 
effect favoring categorical demands to integrate it (the case of teacher-researchers, 
and teachers in senior management training institutions). In particular, mention 
should be made of the fixing of a minimum pension and its revalorisation at 1000 
DH per month, which is supported by the scheme alone. The scheme supports 
family allowances, which represent almost 4% of the expenditure and are 
unbearable in comparison with its financial situation. 
Impact of economic context: One of the main shortcomings of the civilian 
pension system is its close dependence on cyclical fluctuations in the economy. 
Indeed, the economic crisis, which began in 2007, affected the national economy 
and aggravated its social problems. Thus, by 2015, the unemployment rate is 13% 
for higher-level graduates and 28.4% for graduates with an average level, which 
has jeopardized the sustainability of the fund. Decrease in recruitment in the public 
service has led to an increasing number of pensioners, while the number of new 
recruits is steadily decreasing in response to the requirements of the World Bank 
and the IMF (2).  
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Anomaly in the management and governance of the civil pensions regime: The 
governance of CMR and the mismanagement of its savings are the responsibility of 
the government. Indeed, since 1960 and until 2004 the state does not pay the 
employer's share. True, it makes repayments, but without interest. There are 
backlogs that have been accumulating since 1994. The State takes over the deficit 
of the military regime through the use of part of the resources of the civilian 
pension scheme for a long period. The delay in the formation of reserves (1997) 
and the non-payment of the employer's contribution in a regular and total manner 
deprived the fund of a significant contribution to the investment of its contributions 
in recent years. The civil regime has other shortcomings due to its governance 
system and to certain management rules, notably the following: i) Insufficient 
steering mechanisms within the CMR; ii) Failure to invest and manage the pension 
reserve: use of CMR funds in speculative investments (MANAGEM and BNDE); 
iii) Regulatory constraints limiting the investment of these funds in treasury bills 
may deprive the CMR of the opportunities offered by other investments in the 
financial market. 
2.4. Major Reforms Undertaken by the Civil Regime RPC 
 In Morocco, public authorities and pension plan officials have already resorted 
to some adjustments to their parameters without undertaking any in-depth reforms. 
In this context, the first modification carried out by the Moroccan pension fund 
concerned the elements of the remuneration on which the pensions are calculated. 
In this sense, the residence allowance was included within the limit of 10% of the 
basic salary and 50% of the fixed and permanent allowances on 1 January 1990 and 
the second half of the allowances in 1997. 
 Since the creation of the CMR in 1930, its legal and financial status did not 
undergo true reform until the entry into force of Law 43-95 reorganizing the 
institution. This law 43-95 rehabilitated the CMR in its original mission as a public 
institution with a more appropriate legal status guaranteeing an effective 
administrative and financial autonomy. Similarly, the fund of pensions continued 
its reform process in 1996, through the institution of the obligation to establish 
contingency a fund of reserves. In 2004, the government decided to raise the 
contribution rate from 14% to 20% over a period of three years. At the same time, 
with a view to strengthening the reserves set up, the public authorities agreed to 
release to the CMR the sum of 11 billion DH to pay the arrears due in respect of 
the period prior to 1996. The joint effect of these two measures makes it possible to 
achieve financial sustainability by deferring the appearance of the deficit by 5 
years. In January 2006, the Government enacted Law N°. 37-05 (BO No. 5398 of 
23 February 2006), terminating the system of transfer of pension rights from the 
RCAR to the CMR. In 2014, two legislative changes were introduced: i) Article 1 
of Act N°. 012.71 fixing the age limit for retirement "The retention until the end of 
the school or university year of teaching researchers and officials of the Retirement 
age occurs during the said year "; ii) Article 44 (7) of Law N° 011.71 establishing a 
civil pension scheme relating to the postponement of the date of entitlement to the 
pension up to the legal age of retirement (revocation, professional inadequacy, 
delisting of executives following the regularly accepted resignation). 
 On 20 August 2016, Law N°. 72.14 is promulgated by Dahir N°. 1.16.110 
fixing the age limit for personnel affiliated to the CMR. However, the punctual 
nature of these measures and their limited impact show that they do not respond 
fully to the problem of deep imbalances and unsustainability of pension schemes 
that must be analyzed and dealt with over a very long-term horizon. 
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3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. Data and assumptions 
The main data and assumptions used to study the sustainability of the civil 
regime between 1996 and 2015 and to carry out actuarial simulations come from 
several sources: i) The Moroccan pension fund of the retired 'CMR'; ii) The High 
Commission for Planning (HCP); iii) Department of Financial Studies and 
Forecasting (DEPF) of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. For simplicity, we 
keep the inflation rate, the fixed mortality and birth rate over the projection period. 
 Demographic assumptions: The modeling of the populations covered is based 
on average data by age group and sex; i) The database used for demographic and 
financial projections is 31/12/2015;  ii) The projection will be carried out until the 
2045 horizon; iii) To estimate the number of deaths, we will adopt the TD 88-90 
and TV 88-90 female and male mortality tables adjusted by the CMR; iv) The 
disability rate retained for our projection is 1%; v) The number recruited each year 
replaces the number of deaths, invalids and retirees of the year. These new recruits 
will be divided by age and by category according to the proportions calculated on 
the basis of data; vi) The age difference between active and retired and spouse is on 
average 10 years; vii) The early retirement rate is 5%. This rate is applied to the 
age of 57 years; viii) On suppose qu’il n’y a pas de remariage en cas de décès du 
conjoint. 
 Economic assumptions: i) The rate of wage evolution is calculated on the basis 
of the series of average incomes of Morocco of the last decade, equal to 4.5%; ii) 
Contribution rate is equal to 20%; iii) The rate of revalorisation of pensions is set 
by the CMR at 1%; iv) The number of orphans will be projected in terms of weight 
in relation to spouses, ie a rate of 19% of spouses; v) The discount rate is equal to 
the yield on risk-free bonds whose duration corresponds to the duration of the 
commitments, ie 4.4%; vi) The investment rate of reserves must exceed the average 
yield of a 15-year Treasury bond on the secondary market, ie 4.25%; vii) PMarital(x, 
t)= 85%; viii) 𝑃𝑅𝑒𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡)=100%; ix) TRéversion =50%; x) The annuity rate is 2.5% 
for the main pension and 2% for the recipients. 
3.2. Models used 
3.2.1. Econometric Sustainability Tests 
 To study and empirically evaluate the sustainability of RPC deficit, we will use 
stationarity, causality and cointegration tests based on the articles by Smith & Zin 
(1991), Hakkio & Rush (1991), Trehan & Walsh (1988, 1991), Afonso (2005), and 
Haber-Neck (2006) on the sustainability of public debts. First, we apply the 
stationarity test on the technical balance series and the outstanding reserves. For 
this we use the tests Dickey & Fuller (1981), Phillips & Perron (1988) and 
Kwiatoowski, et al., (KPSS) in (1992). Then, we determine Granger causality tests 
between contributions and benefits. Finally, we perform the cointegration tests 
between these two variables using a two-step method, as suggested by Engle & 
Granger (1987). The first is based on an estimate of the long-run relation by 
performing an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Finally, the second consists 
in applying the ADF tests on the estimated residues. 
3.2.2. Actuarial and Financial Model 
 We will construct a model to evaluate the demographic and financial situation 
of the civil regime in 2045 according to different hypotheses that we can modify 
subsequently for piloting. The projection consists in carrying out a stock-flow balance on 
a yearly basis according to the following principle:  
 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 31/12 / 𝑁 =  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 31/12 / 𝑁 − 1 +  𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑁 –  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑁           (1) 
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𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡 ,  𝑅𝑒𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡 ,  𝐴𝑛𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) , 𝐼𝑛𝑣 𝑥, 𝑡 , Rev(x,t) and Orph(x, t) ; Active, 
retired, anticipated, invalid and orphans of age x at date t; 
- 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) : Probability that an affiliated contributor died of age x at date t ; 
- 𝑃𝑅𝑒𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) : Probability that an asset of age x retires in t; 
- 𝑃𝐴𝑛𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡)  : Probability of early retirement at age x at date t; 
- 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑣 (𝑥, 𝑡) : Probability of becoming invalid at age x; 
- 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) : Probability of death of a pensioner (or beneficiary) of age x at date t 
- PRemariage(x, t) : Probability for a person of age x to be married; 
- PMarital(x, t)= probability for a person of age x to be married. 
- 𝑇𝑅é𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = reversion rate applied by the scheme 
 The number of entries in the workforce of early retirees, invalids, pensioners 
and Beneficiary of a survivor's pension of age x + 1 at date t + 1 is: 
- 𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝑃𝐴𝑛𝑡 × (1 − 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 ). 
- 𝑁𝐼𝑛𝑣 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑣 × (1 − 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡). 
- 𝑁𝑅𝑒𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝑃𝑅𝑒𝑡 × (1 − 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 ). 
- 𝑁𝑅𝑒𝑣 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 =
[(𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 +  𝐴𝑛𝑡(𝑥, 𝑡) × 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑡(𝑥, 𝑡) × 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 ]  × 
PMarital(x, t)×( 1 − 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡  (x,t)(x±𝑑, 𝑡)) 
 The number of assets, early retirees, invalids, pensioners and pensioners leaving 
this status between year t and year t + 1 is: 
- 𝑆𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 = [1 − (1 − 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 ) × (1 − 𝑃𝐴𝑛𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡) × (1 −
𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑣 (𝑥, 𝑡) × (1 − 𝑃𝑅𝑒𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑡)] × 𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡 . 
- 𝑆𝐴𝑛𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 = [1 − (1 − 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 ) × (1 − 𝑃𝐴𝑛𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 ]  × 𝐴𝑛𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡  
- 𝑆𝐼𝑛𝑣 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 = [1 − (1 − 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 ) × (1 − 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑣  𝑥, 𝑡 ]  × 𝐼𝑛𝑣 𝑥, 𝑡  
- 𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 = 𝑄𝑅𝑒𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡  
- 𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑣 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 = 𝑄𝑅𝑒𝑡  𝑥 ± 𝑑, 𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑣 𝑥, 𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑣 𝑥, 𝑡 ×  
𝑃𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑥, 𝑡 . 
𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1  = 𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡 + 𝑁𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1  –𝑆𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1             (2) 
 The relationship is the same for invalids, retirees (anticipated and by age limit) 
and Beneficiary of a survivor's pension. In the civil pensions system, the 
population covered is considered open. This means that every year new people 
enter the system. 
 
𝑁𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥 +  1, 𝑡 +  1 =  𝑁𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 +  𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒   𝑥 +  1, 𝑡 +  1                      (3) 
 
3.2.3. Financial projection  
The long-term financial forecast consists of estimating the amount of 
contributions and benefits. 
 
- 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1  × 𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 =𝑠𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝐴𝑐𝑡(𝑥, 𝑡) × (1 + 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 (𝑥, 𝑡) ) 
+ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 ×𝑁𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 –𝑠𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 ×𝑆𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1  
- 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡  𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 × 𝑅𝑒𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 = 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡  1 +
𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  𝑥, 𝑡  + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡  𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 × 𝑁𝑅𝑒𝑡  𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 − 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡  𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1 ×
𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑡 𝑥 + 1, 𝑡 + 1  
- 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣 = 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡 × 𝑄𝑅𝑒𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝑇𝑅é𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑡 × 𝑄𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×
𝑇𝑅é𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛  
 The plan's income is derived for the most part from the contributions paid by 
the plan's contributors and for another part of the financial income generated by the 
reserves. 
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𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑥, 𝑡 =  𝑠𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝐴𝑐𝑡(𝑥, 𝑡) × 𝜑 𝑡 𝑥                     (4) 
 The deficits recorded in 2014 and 2015 negatively affected the reserve and 
consequently the financial income generated by the fund. Therefore, we are not 
going to project financial products. 
  
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑡 =  𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡  𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑡 𝑥, 𝑡 𝑥 + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑣 𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑣 𝑥, 𝑡 +
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ 𝑥, 𝑡 × 𝑂𝑟𝑝ℎ 𝑥, 𝑡         (5) 
 
 Administrative and management costs represent too low a percentage of total 
plan expenses, or 0.51% in 2015. As a result, these management fees will not be 
projected 
- The equilibrium rate 
In pure pay - as – you - go, this rate is: 𝑇𝑐 =
𝑁𝑟  ×𝑃𝑟
𝑁𝑐  ×𝑆𝑐
 
Pension plan in pay as you go provisioned : 𝑇𝑐 =
𝑁𝑟  ×𝑃𝑟  + (𝑅𝑛  −𝑅𝑛−1) −µ  ×𝑅𝑛−1
𝑁𝑐  ×𝑆𝑐
 
- 𝑁𝑐  : Number of active contributors 
- 𝑇𝑐  : contribution rate of the scheme 
- 𝑆𝑐  : contribution base 
- 𝑁𝑟  : number of pensioners 
- 𝑃𝑟  : average pension received by the pensioner 
- 𝑅𝑛  : reserves of year n 
- 𝑅𝑛  −𝑅𝑛−1 : change in reserves 
- µ: rate of return on reserves 
 The model thus constructed can be used to simulate the new parametric reform, 
which will focus on combining the four scenarios, such as increasing the statutory 
retirement age to 63, modifying the contribution rate 28% (currently 20%), the 
reduction of the annuity rate to 2% and finally the liquidation of the pension taking 
the average of the last eight years 
 
4. Finding 
4.1. Analysis of current sustainability indicators 
 During the year 2015, the collection of employee contributions and employer 
contributions to the scheme reached almost the same amount in 2014, or 15,878 
MDhs. Expenses of the civil pensions scheme amounted to 18,556.19 MDhs in 
2015 against 16,815.04 MDhs in 2014, registering an increase of 10.35%. 
 
  
Figure 1. Evolution o income and expenditure between 1996 and 2015 
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The civil pension scheme remains in excess of 2013 but with a downward trend 
of 62.58% compared to 2012. With the exception of the year 2011 when the civil 
regime registered a surplus value of 456.73 million DH due to the impact of the 
measures decided by the government relating to the revaluation of the minimum 
pension and the increase of the net salary of civil servants of 600 Dirhams monthly 
and the payment by the State of a share of its arrears of the previous years. This 
surplus continues to have a downward trend and to reach different values until 
2014 when for the first time it reached a deficit of 936 million DH against a 
technical surplus of 704 million DH in 2013. In 2015, this deficit continued its 
upward trend by realizing an amount of 2,678.19 billion DH. 
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of technical balance of RPC in MMDhs between 1996 and 2015 
Source: Established by us, data from the Moroccan Pension Fund 
 
 The rate of coverage of expenses by technical resources is changing with a 
downward trend over the past decade, from 94.4% in 2014 to 85.5% in 2015. The 
reserve fund ends the year at book value (net of provisions), with 84.92 MDhs 
against 85.02 MDhs in 2014. The cumulative income generated by the fund since 
the beginning of the asset management business in 1997 amounted to 34.166 
billion Dhs at the end of 2015, compared with 31.443 billion in 2014, ie 40% of the 
total reserves made up.  
 
 
Figure 3. Change in coverage as a percentage of RPC between 1996 and 2015 
Source: Established by us, data from the Moroccan Pension Fund 
 
The reserve fund ratio represents the proportion of benefits at the end of the 
year that can be paid out of outstanding reserves at the beginning of the same year. 
In 2015, the reserve fund was able to cover 4.58 times of benefits against 4.81 in 
2014.  
 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of RPC reserves in Billions of Dhs between 2004 and 2015 
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The demographic ratio changed from 4.79 active contributor for a retired in 
1998-1999 to only 2,303 in 2014 and to 2,269 in 2015. The analysis of the financial 
results of the pension system reveals a heavy trend of widening deficits and a 
decline in the coverage of benefits by the reserve fund, which could weigh heavily 
on public finances over the long term and jeopardize the viability and The 
sustainability of the pay-as-you-go system. 
 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of the ratio of funds in the reserves of the civil pensions system between 2005 and 
2015 
 
 
Figure 6. Evolution of the civil regime demographic ratio between 1998 and 2015 
 
4.2. Results of econometric tests 
Stationarity test of technical balance and reserve funds: The results obtained for 
the Dickey-Fuller and PP statistics indicate that the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity can not be rejected for the technical balance and the reserve fund. 
Statistics are well above critical values at 1%. These results are an indication of the 
unsustainability of these two variables. 
 
Table 1. Results of the stationarity tests of Technical balance 
Variable tested 
 
Test 
Null hypothesis tested 
 
Calculated 
value 
 
Unit critical 
value 
 
Result 
Technical 
Balance 
 
ADF Non stationarity 
 
-0,876867 
 
 
-4.571559 
 
Non stationarity 
 
PP Non stationarity 
 
-0,876867 
 
 
 
-4.571559 
 
 
Non stationarity 
 
KPSS stationarity 
 
   0.146642 
 
 
 
 0.146642 
 
 
 
0,21600 
 
stationarity 
 
 
 The KPSS statistic is less than the critical value at 1%, so it is not possible to 
reject the null hypothesis of stationarity for the technical balance and the reserve 
fund. These results indicate a level of technical balance and sustainable reserve 
funds. These results do not allow us to decide on the sustainability of the civil 
regime of the CMR. 
 
Table 2. Reserve Fund Stationarity Test Results 
Variable tested 
 
Test 
Null hypothesis 
tested 
 
Calculated 
value 
 
Unit critical 
value 
 
Result 
Reserve Fund 
 
ADF Non stationarity 
 
-0,833813 
 
 
 
 
-5,124875 
 
 
 
 
Non stationarity 
 
PP Non stationarity 
 
-0,795818 
 
 
 
 
-5,124875 
 
 
 
 
 
Non stationarity 
 
KPSS stationarity 
 
0,176007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,21600 stationarity 
 
Source: Established by us, data of the Moroccan pension fund using Eviews  
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Co-integration test: Test of stationarity of contributions and benefits. The results 
obtained for the ADF (-2.320735) and (-1.826708) respectively indicate that the 
null hypothesis of non-stationarity (in level) can not be rejected for contributions 
and benefits. Statistics are well above critical values at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 
Table 3. Result of the ADF test applied to the first difference of the contributions 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.986813  0.0309 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.616209  
 5% level  -3.710482  
 10% level  -3.297799  
 
For the first difference, the results of the ADF (-3.986813) and (-4.744146) 
respectively are lower than the critical values at 1%, 5% and 10%. Therefore the 
null hypothesis is rejected for contributions and benefits. 
 
Table 4. Result of the ADF test applied to the first difference in benefits 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.744146 0.0079 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.616209  
 5% level  -3.710482  
 10% level  -3.297799  
 
Causality test in the sense of Granger: We have recovered the two stationary 
series, that is, the first difference series of benefits and contributions. For the 
criteria of AIC (Akaike Information Criteria) and SC (Schwarz Criteria), the 
number of delays is 2.  
 
Table 5. Results of the Granger causality test 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
 DCOT does not Granger Cause DPREST  16 0.00785 0.9922 
 DPREST does not Granger Cause DCOT 0.08531 0.9188 
 
We note that both p-values 0.9922 and 0.9188 are both above the critical values 
of 1%, 5% and 10%. Consequently, neither of the two differentiated series is 
influenced in the Granger sense by the other. 
Residue testing: The non-stationarity of the residues meant the non-
cointegration of benefits and contributions. In general, these results show the non-
sustainability of the civil regime of the CMR essentially in recent years.  
 
Table 6. Result of the ADF test applied to residues at 1% 
Variable 
analyzed 
 
Test 
Null hypothesis 
tested 
Calculated 
value 
Unit critical value Result 
Residue 
 
ADF Non stationarity 
 
-0.804434 
 
-4.571559 
 
Non stationarity 
 
(2) Direct responsibility lies with the State, which has implemented dictated neoliberal policies, reduced the 
number of civil servants, reduced wages and increased unemployment. 
 
The economic idea behind the cointegration tests is that the technical balance 
(the difference in value between contributions and benefits) should increase as 
contributions increase and benefits decrease. The increase in the technical balance 
then makes it possible to reduce the deficit and to improve the outstanding funds of 
the reserves and this to deal with the payments of the implicit debt. 
 The civilian regime must therefore focus on the technical balance for several 
reasons. Indeed, if this difference is negative, then there is a deficit that will have 
an effect on the depletion of reserves. In this case, the regime will have to fill this 
lack of financing by using other means of financing (borrowing, for example). 
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4.3. Sustainability analysis for the current scheme projection. 
 
Table 7. Pre-reform civilian projection result 
2016 2020 2023 2025 2030 2045
Demographic Report 2,198 1,656 1,507 1,438 1,084 0,656
Technical coverage 90,33% 69,23% 63,35% 60,60% 46,44% 32,25%
Technical Balance in (MDhs)-4,4E+09 -1,6E+10 -2,5E+10 -3,1E+10 -4,6E+10 -6,4E+10
Outstanding Reserve Funds 8,13E+10 5,45E+10 -1,6E+10 -1,03E+11 -5,7E+11 -1,6E+12
Reserve Fund Ratio 433,06% 138,16% -26,45% -128,13% -349,56% -522,46%
equilibrium rate 22,45% 28,85% 31,50% 33,00% 37,00% 45,75%  
 
 The continuing decline in the demographic ratio is due to the effect of the 
increase in the number of pensioners compared to the number of workers whose 
number remained stagnant from the year 2015 to the year 2045. The occurrence of 
a technical deficit of Dh 937 million from 2014 and the second deficit in 2015 has 
led to a mechanical increase in the contribution rate needed to balance the scheme. 
The contribution rate must be of the order of 45.75% in 2045, which shows the 
serious deficit incurred by the civil regime of the CMR. 
 Given the increase in benefits and the reduction in contributions, it is clear that 
the coverage rate is falling. Thus, it rose from 85.5% in 2015 to 32.25% in 2045. 
From the year 2014, the scheme began to draw on its reserve fund to finance the 
gap between the revenue and expenditure of the scheme. However, this situation 
would gradually lead to a depletion of reserves which would become negative in 
2023 with an amount of about DM 15 995 billion if no action is taken. Until 2022, 
reserve fund ratio values are positive and above 100%, which means that CMR 
reserves would cover at least 100% of its commitments. 
4.4. Parametric reform simulation results 
 By adopting the parametric reform, we were able to gain a positive technical 
balance during the period 2019-2025. This will have a remarkable effect on the 
viability of the regime compared to the central scenario. Beginning in 2026, the 
technical balance would become deficit and this deficit would continue to increase 
in a very remarkable way in the long term, which would make the system once 
again financially unsustainable. 
 
 
Figure 8. Evolution of post-reform technical balance between 2016-2045 
 
Changes in the parameters will result in an increase in fund inflows 
(contributions and investment income) higher than outflows (benefits). This 
translates into a deferral of the date of depletion of reserve funds to 2032 (instead 
of 2023 in the case of the status quo). 
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Figure 9. Trend in the stock of post-reform reserves between 2016-2045 
 
The results of the post-reform financial analysis of the pay-as-you-go system 
suggest that the current system is unsustainable and continues to require significant 
transfers from the budget. 
4.5. Proposal of the other reforms 
Introduction of a funded pillar: The current situation of the system and the risk 
of the long-term deficit require a reorientation towards the economic logic, namely 
the capitalization that will increase the yield and build abundant reserves to cover 
the income of retirees and be able to adapt to the change demographic situation in 
Morocco. In this sense, it is preferable to adopt the approach advocated by the 
World Bank, which consists of a gradual transition to a two-pillar system that 
combines pay-as-you-go and funded retirement. This principle is therefore related 
to the acceptance of the fact that the pension consists of a cumulation of income, 
part of which is linked to the pay-as-you-go mechanism and other parties linked to 
the own contribution and savings affiliated contributors. These accounts will be 
converted into life annuities upon retirement. The transition from a distribution-
managed system to a two-pillar system, however, poses the difficult problem of 
financing the cost of transition 
Creation of a public pole and a private pole (reform proposed by the State): In a 
second step, the government will put in place two major pension poles. The first 
concerns the civilian system under the CMR and the RCAR as a basic system and 
another complementary system. The second, private, will be managed by the 
CNSS, in addition to a complementary scheme. The regrouping of existing 
schemes within one pole dedicated to the public sector and another group dedicated 
to the private sector has many advantages; i) Orientation towards a new regime that 
is less deficient than the current CMR civil pension system; ii) Ceiling on civil 
pensions; iii) Harmonization of pension settlement rules throughout the public 
sector; iv) Extension of the old-age risk coverage for the benefit of the uncovered 
populations of the private sector (liberal professions, ...) in a single system 
managed by CNSS; v) Development of the demographic engine for the private 
sector through new affiliations. 
 A fusion of the schemes in a public entity, in the Moroccan case, is directly to 
favor certain schemes, to the detriment of others. Two aspects derive from this 
statement: A first aspect is the distribution of the generosity of the schemes over 
time. Typically, the RCAR is not very generous with regard to the creation of the 
first pension (2% annuity rate, basis of calculation based on all wages) and 
generous as regards the revaluation (based on wages). The CMR presents an 
exactly opposite situation: first very generous pension (annual rate of 2.5%, basis 
of calculation based on last salary) and a low revaluation, indexed in practice to 
one-third of inflation. This is compounded by the fact that the average salary of the 
RCAR is much lower than the average salary of the CMR. Since generosity is not 
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at the same level in time, a first problem of equity between regimes arises. At the 
time of consolidation, the least prudent public plan will use the provisions of the 
plan that have had strong reserves to clear its accounts. The most penalized regime 
in the state is obviously the RCAR, functioning practically in capitalization. The 
consolidation of the two-pole fund is certainly a more solid and advantageous 
solution, but it requires a very high transition cost and is therefore not immediately 
applicable. 
Grouping of all regimes into one single pole: The Single Plan (single multi-
pillar system), which consists of the merger of all the funds into one, which is 
responsible for managing all pensions, proves to be the most radical solution. This 
scenario remains the most difficult and unlikely both due to the specificity of each 
fund in terms of generosity, reserves constituted and operating procedures as well 
as the characteristics of the population covered (public, semi-public, Private and 
independent). Similarly, the fusion of the Public Pole with the Private Sector will 
risk placing the burden of retirement in the public sector on private companies. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Based on the principle pay-as-you-go, the civil scheme has shown real 
difficulties in coping with new demographic, economic and financial constraints. It 
should also be noted that the measures taken so far remain anchored solely on the 
financial sustainability of the schemes, without taking account of the social and 
economic aspects of the members and pensioners or of expanding social coverage. 
It is therefore important to propose the establishment of intelligent ways of 
reforming our current system at several levels in order to maintain both the long-
term viability and the fair distribution of burdens between generations. According 
to the analysis of the different scenarios envisaged, it appears that each scenario 
presents negative and positive effects at the same time, making the choice 
increasingly difficult. In this context the reform of the pension system should be 
rethought in a framework of overall coherence and should be accompanied by the 
introduction of new measures to improve financial and social sustainability, the 
most important of which are: i) Improving governance through the establishment of 
modern, representative, effective governance bodie; ii) The civil regime must be 
subject to a control which must go beyond the administrative and financial side to 
deal with the technical aspect; iii) The implementation of legal and institutional 
reforms aimed at updating the legal status of the pension fund, as well as all 
legislative texts describing its operation; iv) Optimization of the financial 
management of civilian reserve funds; v) The increase in employment rates and 
coverage rates, which currently appear to be excessively low to alleviate the 
financial difficulties that will characterize the Moroccan civilian pension system. 
The pensions’funds should simulate a reform based on the technique of notional 
(NDC) that allows to overcome the purely financial logics and to draw a departure 
from the top of the current crisis of pension system, by putting in place a system 
democratically more transparent, financially more sustainable, and socially more 
fair. 
 
 
Thanks 
Financial and Econometric Study of the Sustainability and Evaluation of 
Scenarios of Reforms for The civil regime of the Moroccan pension fund. 
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